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ABSTRACT
Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) offers software applications
a shielded execution environment, dubbed enclave, to protect their
confidentiality and integrity from malicious operating systems.
As processors with this extended feature become commercially
available, many new software applications are developed to enrich
to the SGX-enabled software ecosystem. One important primitive
for these applications is a secure communication channel between
the enclave and a remote trusted party. The SSL/TLS protocol, which
is the de facto standard for protecting transport-layer network
communications, has been broadly regarded a natural choice for
such purposes. However, in this paper, we show that the marriage
between SGX and SSL may not be a smooth sailing.
Particularly, we consider a category of side-channel attacks
against SSL/TLS implementations in secure enclaves, which we call
the control-flow inference attacks. In these attacks, the malicious
operating system kernel may perform a powerfulman-in-the-kernel
attack to collect execution traces of the enclave programs at the
page level, the cacheline level, or the branch level, while position-
ing itself in the middle of the two communicating parties. At the
center of our work is a differential analysis framework, dubbed
Stacco, to dynamically analyze the SSL/TLS implementations and
detect vulnerabilities—discernible execution traces—that can be
exploited as decryption oracles. Surprisingly, in spite of the pre-
vailing constant-time programming paradigm adopted by many
cryptographic libraries, we found exploitable vulnerabilities in the
latest versions of all the SSL/TLS libraries we have examined.
To validate the detected vulnerabilities, we developed a man-in-
the-kernel adversary to demonstrate Bleichenbacher attacks against
the latest OpenSSL library running in the SGX enclave (with the
help of Graphene) and completely broke the PreMasterSecret
encrypted by a 4096-bit RSA public key with only 57,286 queries.
We also conducted CBC padding oracle attacks against the lat-
est GnuTLS running in Graphene-SGX and an open-source SGX-
implementation of mbedTLS (i.e., mbedTLS-SGX) that runs directly
inside the enclave, and showed that it only needs 48,388 and 25,717
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queries, respectively, to break one block of AES ciphertext. Em-
pirical evaluation suggests these man-in-the-kernel attacks can be
completed within one or two hours.
1 INTRODUCTION
Software applications’ security heavily depends on the security of
the underlying system software. In traditional computing environ-
ments, if the operating system is compromised, the security of the
applications it supports is also compromised. Therefore, the trusted
computing base (TCB) of software applications include not only
the software itself but also the underlying system software and
hardware.
To reduce the TCB of some applications that contain sensitive
code and data, academic researchers have proposed many software
systems to support shielded execution—i.e., execution of a piece
of code whose confidentiality and integrity is protected from an
untrusted system software (e.g., [26, 28, 30, 33, 37, 44, 45, 49, 56,
68, 74, 77]). Most of these systems adopted a hypervisor-based ap-
proach to protecting the memory of victim applications against
attacks from malicious operating systems. Although promising,
these academic prototypes have yet to see the light of real-world
adoption. Not until the advent of Intel Software Guard eXtension
(SGX) [2], a hardware extension available in the most recent Intel
processors, did the concept of shielded execution become practi-
cal to real-world applications. SGX enforces both confidentiality
and integrity of userspace programs by isolating regions of their
memory space (i.e., enclaves) from other software components, in-
cluding the most privileged system software–no memory reads
or writes can be performed inside the enclaves by any external
software, regardless of its privilege level. As such, SGX greatly re-
duces the TCB of the shielded execution, enabling a wide range of
applications [20, 36, 54, 59, 65, 76].
In typical application scenarios [20, 36, 76], shielded execution
does not work completely alone; it communicates with remote
trusted parties using secure channels, e.g., SSL/TLS protocols. Se-
cure Sockets Layer (SSL) and its successor, Transport Layer Security
(TLS), are transport-layer security protocols that provide secure
communication channels using a set of cryptographic primitives.
SSL/TLS protocols are expected, as part of their design goals, to
prevent man-in-the-middle attackers who are capable of eaves-
dropping, intercepting, replaying, modifying and injecting network
packets between the two communicating parties. Therefore, appli-
cations of Intel SGX [20, 36, 76] typically regard SSL/TLS modules
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inside SGX enclaves as basic security primitives to establish end-
to-end communication security.
Attacks against the SSL/TLS protocol have been reported over the
years, unfortunately. One important category of these attacks is or-
acle attacks [31]. In an oracle attack, the adversary interactively and
adaptively queries a vulnerable SSL/TLS implementation and uses
the response (or some side-channel information, e.g., the latency of
the response) as an oracle to break the encryption. Well-known ex-
amples of oracle attacks include the Lucky Thirteen Attack [12], the
Bleichenbacher attack [22], the DROWN attack [18], the POODLE
attack [52], etc. Prior demonstration of these attacks have shown
that they enable network attackers to decrypt arbitrary messages
of the SSL record protocol or decrypt the PreMasterSecret of the SSL
handshake protocol. We will detail these attacks in Section 2. Due
to the broad adoption of the SSL/TLS protocol (e.g., in HTTPS, se-
cure email exchanges), any of these attacks is devastating and easily
headlines of the security news (e.g., [41]). Accordingly, the SSL/TLS
protocol and its implementations have been frequently updated
after the publicity of these attacks. A commonly used solution is to
hide the oracles. For example, in cases where the oracle is the SSL
Alert message indicating padding errors, the error message can be
unified to conceal the real reason for the errors [35, 58] (so that the
adversary cannot differentiate padding errors and MAC errors, see
Section 2). As of today, almost all widely used SSL/TLS implemen-
tations are resilient to oracle attacks because the oracles have been
successfully hidden from the network attackers [4, 10, 35, 58].
However, adoption of SSL/TLS in SGX enclaves brings new se-
curity challenges. Although SGX offers confidentiality protection,
through memory isolation and encryption, to code and data inside
secure enclaves, it has been shown vulnerable to side-channel at-
tacks [43, 63, 73]. Side-channel attacks are a type of security attacks
against the confidentiality of a system or application by making
inferences from measurements of observable side-channel events.
These attacks have been studied in the past twenty years in multi-
ple contexts, most noticeably in desktop computers, cloud servers,
and mobile devices where CPU micro-architectures [78, 79], soft-
ware data structures [40, 57], or other system resources are shared
between mutually-distrusting software components. What makes
side-channel attacks on SGX different is that these attacks can be
performed by the privileged system software, which enables many
new attack vectors. For example, Xu et al. [73] demonstrated that
by manipulating page table entries of the memory pages of secure
enclaves, an adversary with system privilege could enforce page
faults during the execution of enclave programs, thus collecting
traces of memory accesses at the page-granularity. Recently, Lee
et al. [43] demonstrated that the control flow of enclave programs
can be precisely traced at every branch instruction by exploiting
the shared Branch Prediction Units (BPU).
The key insight of this paper is that while SSL/TLS is designed
to defend against man-in-the-middle attacks, its implementation in
SGX enclaves must tackle a stronger man-in-the-kernel adversary
who is capable of not only positioning himself in the middle of the
two communicating parties, but controlling the underlying oper-
ating system kernel and manipulating system resources to collect
execution traces of the enclave programs from various side chan-
nels. Particularly, we show that the powerful man-in-the-kernel
attackers can create new decryption oracles from the state-of-the-
art SSL/TLS implementations and resurrect the Bleichenbacher
attack and CBC padding oracle attacks against SGX enclaves.
Stacco.At the core of our work is the Side-channel Trace Analyzer
for finding Chosen-Ciphertext Oracles (Stacco), which is a software
framework for conducting differential analysis on the SSL/TLS
implementations to detect sensitive control-flow vulnerabilities that
can be exploited to create decryption oracles for CBC padding
oracle attacks and Bleichenbacher attacks. Particularly, to enable
automated large-scale analysis of various off-the-shelf SSL/TLS
libraries, we built Stacco on top of a dynamic instrumentation
engine (i.e., Pin [46]) and an open-source SSL/TLS packet generation
tool (i.e., TLS-Attacker [66]), so that we can perform standard tests
to multiple libraries in an automated manner. To understand the
exploitability of the vulnerabilities, we also modeled three types of
control-flow inference attacks, including page-level attacks [63, 73],
cacheline-level attacks [23, 60] and branch-level attacks [43], and
empowered Stacco to analyze vulnerabilities on each of these
levels. Our analysis results suggest all the popular open-source
SSL/TLS libraries we have examined are vulnerable to both types
of oracle attacks, raising the questions of secure development and
deployment of SSL/TLS protocols inside SGX enclaves.
To validate the vulnerabilities identified by Stacco, we demon-
strated several such man-in-the-kernel attacks against the latest
versions of popular cryptographic libraries: Particularly, we im-
plemented a Bleichenbarcher attack against the latest OpenSSL
library [9] running in the SGX enclaves (with the help of Graphene-
SGX [70], a library OS that supports unmodified applications to run
inside SGX enclaves) and completely broke the PreMasterSecret
encrypted by a 4096-bit RSA public key with only 57,286 queries.
We also conducted CBC padding oracle attacks against the lat-
est GnuTLS [3] running in Graphene-SGX and an open-source
SGX-implementation of mbedTLS [8] that runs directly inside the
enclave, and showed that it only needs 48,388 and 25,717 queries,
respectively, to break one block of AES ciphertext from TLS con-
nections using these libraries. Empirical evaluation suggests these
man-in-the-kernel attacks can be completed within one or two
hours. These demonstrated attacks not only provide evidence that
Stacco can effectively identify exploitable sensitive control-flow
vulnerabilities in SSL/TLS implementations, but also suggest these
oracle attacks conducted in a man-in-the-kernel manner are effi-
cient for practical security intrusion.
Responsible disclosure.We have reported the vulnerabilities and
demonstrated oracle attacks to Intel, OpenSSL, GnuTLS, mbedTLS.
Contributions of this work include:
• The first study of critical side-channel threats against SSL/TLS
implementations in SGX enclaves that lead to complete com-
promises of SSL/TLS-protected secure communications.
• The design and implementation of Stacco, a differential analy-
sis framework for detecting sensitive control-flow vulnerabili-
ties in SSL/TLS implementations, which also entails:
• A systematic characterization of control-flow inference attacks
against SGX enclaves (e.g., page-level attacks, the cacheline-
level attacks, and branch-level attacks), which empowers Stacco
to analyze the vulnerability with abstracted attacker models.
• A measurement study of the latest versions of popular SSL/TLS
libraries using Stacco that shows that all of them, including
OpenSSL, GnuTLS, mbedTLS, WolfSSL, and LibreSSL, are vul-
nerable to control-flow inference attacks and exploitable in
oracle attacks.
• An empiricalman-in-the-kernel demonstration of oracle attacks
against the latest version of OpenSSL and GnuTLS running
inside Graphene-SGX and an open-source SGX-implementation
of mbedTLS, showing that such attacks are highly efficient on
real SGX hardware.
Roadmap. The rest of this paper is outlined as follows. Section 2
introduces related background concepts. Section 3 systematically
characterizes control-flow inference attacks. Section 4 describes a
differential analysis framework for detecting sensitive control-flow
vulnerabilities in SSL/TLS implementations. We demonstrate oracle
attacks against some of the vulnerable SSL/TLS implementations to
validate these detected vulnerabilities in Section 5, and then discuss
countermeasures in Section 6. In Section 7, we briefly summarize
related work in the field. Section 8 concludes our paper.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Intel Software Guard Extension
Intel SGX is a new processor architecture extension that is available
on the most recent Intel processors (e.g., Skylake and later processor
families). It aims to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
code and data of sensitive applications against malicious system
software [2]. The protection is achieved through a set of security
primitives, such as memory isolation and encryption, sealed storage,
remote attestation, etc. In this section, we briefly introduce some of
the key features of Intel SGX that is relevant to this paper.
Memory isolation and encryption. Intel SGX reserves a range
of continuous physical memory exclusively for enclaves. This mem-
ory range is called Enclave Page Cache (EPC), which is a subset of
Processor Reserved Memory (PRM). The EPC is managed in similar
ways to regular physical memory and is divided into 4KB pages.
Correspondingly, a range of virtual addresses, called Enclave Linear
Address Range (ELRANGE), is reserved in the virtual address space
of the applications. The page tables responsible for address trans-
lation are managed by the untrusted operating system. Therefore,
the mapping of each virtual memory page to the physical memory,
access permissions, cacheability, etc., can be controlled by the sys-
tem software that is potentially malicious. To maintain the integrity
of the page tables, the memory access permission dictated by the
developers are recorded, upon enclave initiation, in Enclave Page
Cache Map (EPCM), which is also part of PRM (thus protected from
the malicious system software). During the address translation,
EPCM is consulted to enforce access permission by bitwise-AND
the set of permissions in the EPCM entries and those in the page
table entries.
The memory management unit (MMU) enforces integrity and
confidentiality of EPC pages. Only code running in enclave mode
can access virtual memory pages in the ELRANGE that are mapped
to the EPC. Each EPC page has at most one owner at a time, and
the EPCM serves as a revert page table that records virtual address
space of each enclave that maps to the corresponding EPC page. An
EPC page can be evicted and stored in the regular physical memory
region. Evicted EPC pages are encrypted by Memory Encryption
Engine (MEE) to guarantee their confidentiality.
2.2 SSL/TLS
Figure 1: The SSL hand-
shake protocol.
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
is a general purpose secu-
rity protocol proposed by
Netscape Communications in
1994, which was designed to
transparently protect the con-
fidentiality and integrity of
the network communications
between applications running
on top of the TCP layer. Due
to security flaws, SSL v1.0
was never released to the pub-
lic. SSL v2.0 was released in
1995 and deprecated in 2011;
SSL v3.0 was released in 1996
and deprecated in 2015 (after
the publicity of POODLE at-
tacks [52]). Its successor proto-
cols, Transport Layer Security
(TLS) v1.0, v1.1, and v1.2, were released in 1999, 2006 and 2008,
respectively. They are all still being used broadly. TLS v1.3 is still
a working draft as of August 2017. SSL and TLS are referred to-
gether as the SSL/TLS protocol. SSL/TLS has two sub-protocols, the
handshake protocol, and the record layer protocol. The handshake
protocol negotiates security primitives (ciphers, their parameters,
and cryptographic keys), and the record layer protocol uses the
negotiated security primitives for encryption and authentication of
the payload data, such as HTTP, IMAP, SMTP, POP3, etc.
Handshake protocol. The SSL handshake protocol allows the
communicating server and client to authenticate each other and
negotiate an algorithm for message encryption and integrity protec-
tion. The protocol is illustrated in Figure 1. The client initiates the
SSL connection with a ClientHellomessage, which tells the server
the maximum SSL version it supports, a 28-byte random value, the
identifier of the SSL session that this current SSL connection is
associated to, the set of supported ciphers, and the compression al-
gorithms. The server, upon receiving the client’s request, responds
with a ServerHello message, with the same set of information
from the server. The server will then send a Certificate message,
if it is the first connection of the session, to offer its certificate to
the client. If the certificate used by the server is a certificate that
uses Digital Signature Algorithms (DSA) or a signing-only RSA
certificate, it does not have a key that can be used for encryption
purposes. In this case, the server will send a ServerKeyExchange
message to inform the client its Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters to
perform the key exchange.
Upon receiving the ServerHelloDone message from the server,
the client sends a ClientKeyExchangemessage to the server. If RSA
key exchanges are used, the PreMasterSecret will be encrypted
using the RSA public key embedded in the certificate and sent along
with the message; if Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithms are
used, this message will only include the client’s DH parameters—the
PreMasterSecret is calculated by the server and client respectively
without being sent over the network. After this step, the server and
the client already share the secrets for generating the symmetric
encryption keys and Message Authentication Code (MAC) keys.
The ChangeCipherSpec messages from the client and the server
notify the other party about the forthcoming changes to the cipher
algorithms that have just been negotiated.
Particularly, when RSA-based key exchange method is selected,
the PreMasterSecret is encrypted using the server’s public RSA
key. The format of the plaintext message of ClientKeyExchange
conforms to a variant of PKCS#1 v1.5 format (shown in Figure 3):
it must start with 0x0002 which is followed by 205 bytes of non-
zero paddings provided that the total message is 256-byte long
(determined by the size of the server’s private key). Then a 0x00
byte following the padding is regarded as the segmentation mark,
and the 48-byte PreMasterSecret is attached at the end. According
to RFC5246 (TLS v1.2), in order to defeat Bleichenbacher Attacks,
which we will detail shortly, the server first generates a random
value, and then decrypts the ClientKeyExchange message. If the
decrypted data does not conform to the PKCS#1 standard or the
length of the PreMasterSecret is incorrect, the random value will
be used for the rest of the computation, as if the decryption was
successful.
TLS v1.0, v1.1, and v1.2 support a variety of cipher suites. For
example, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA is one of the cipher
suites which employs RSA for both authentication and key ex-
change, the symmetric encryption uses the AES block cipher in
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, and SHA-1 based HMAC is
used for integrity protection of the payload. Other key exchange
algorithms can also be specified. For instance, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA
uses elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange and Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm for authentication.
Record layer protocol. The record protocol of TLS protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the payload via symmetric encryp-
tion and MAC algorithms. Block encryption in the Cipher Block
Chaining Mode (CBC) is one of the most widely used modes of
operation for block ciphers. The encryption and authentication is
conducted in the MAC-pad-encrypt scheme, as shown in Figure 2.
The MAC of the data payload is first calculated to protect its in-
tegrity, and then the resulting data is padded with dummy bytes
(conforming to SSL/TLS specifications) so that the total message
size is multiples of the block size (e.g., 16 bytes in AES). The result-
ing data blocks are then encrypted using the symmetric cipher in
the CBC mode.
Figure 2: Packet format of SSL/TLS payload encryption.
Figure 3: Format of the plaintext of the ClientKeyExchange
message (with 2048-bit RSA keys).
2.3 Bleichenbacher Attacks against SSL/TLS
Bleichenbacher attacks [22] is the first practical adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attack against RSA cryptographic algorithms conforming
to the PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding schemes. It exploits the format cor-
rectness of the decrypted plaintext as an oracle and decrypts, by
repeatedly querying the oracle about the correctness of carefully-
crafted ciphertexts, an RSA public-key-encrypted message without
the need of the RSA private keys. Multiple studies have shown
that Bleichenbacher Attacks have practical implication in network
security [19, 22, 42, 47]. Particularly, these attacks have been demon-
strated to work against SSL/TLS protocols that adopt RSA algo-
rithms to encrypt the PreMasterSecrets and at the same time re-
veal non-conformant error messages over the network. Most widely
used SSL/TLS implementations today are believed to be immune
to Bleichenbacher Attacks as the oracle-enabling error messages
have been suppressed. We have summarized a brief history of the
related studies in Section 7.
In this paper, we implemented the optimized Bleichenbacher
attack proposed by Bardou et al. [19]. The attack relies on the
artifact that a correctly formatted ClientKeyExchange message,
before encryption, must begin with 0x0002. Therefore, its valuem
must satisfy 2B ≤ m < 3B, where B is a constant that starts with
0x0001 and ends with a running of 8(k − 2) of 0s (k is the length
of m in bytes). By repeatedly querying the oracle and finding a
sequence of si so that eachmi (ci ≡ c · (si )emodn,mi ≡ (ci )dmodn
and m ≡ cdmod n) is also PKCS conformant, the adversary can
gradually narrow down the possible value ranges form until only
one possibility remains. Interested readers can refer to Bardou et
al. [19] for details of the algorithm.
The oracle strength is defined as the conditional probability of
the oracle returning true given the decrypted plaintext message
indeed begins with 0x0002. A strong oracle means the adversary
can complete the attack with fewer queries. This is because the
probability that a query with messagem beginning with 0x0002
is returned by the oracle as false is smaller; hence the adversary
can collect a sequence of such messages faster. For example, if the
oracle always returns true when the plaintext message starts with
0x0002, the oracle strength is 1. In contrast, if the oracle returns
true if and only if the following three conditions hold at the same
time, for instance, (1) the first two bytes of the plaintext are 0x0002,
(2) the next 8 bytes do not contain 0x00, and (3) the next 246 bytes
that follow (in the case of a 2048-bit RSA encryption) do have at
least one byte of 0x00, the oracle strength is
(255256 )
8
× (1 − (255256 )
246
) ≈ 0.599
.
2.4 CBC Padding Oracle Attacks
It is known that theMAC-pad-encrypt used in SSL/TLS is vulnerable
to padding oracle attacks [12, 13, 25, 52, 71]. The vulnerability can
be exploited when the CBC mode of operation is chosen. In such
attacks, a carefully-crafted application data packet is repeatedly
sent by the man-in-the-middle attacker to the vulnerable SSL/TLS
server/client (collectively called the SSL agent). Each time the mes-
sage is sent to the victim SSL agent for decryption, the attacker
modifies the ciphertext slightly to conduct an adaptively chosen ci-
phertext attack. The SSL agent checks the correctness of the padding
and the MAC after decrypting the message. If there are errors in the
format of the padding or content of the MAC, an alert message will
be returned. If the attacker can tell if the error message is caused by
only the padding error or by both padding errors and MAC errors,
she has a padding oracle that tells her whether her modification of
the ciphertext is decrypted into a correct padding (very unlikely to
have a correct MAC). In SSL v3.0, the padding format only specifies
the last padding byte has the value of the total padding length, while
the other bytes could have random values. In TLS specifications,
all padding bytes have the same value, which is the number of the
padding bytes. Therefore, a correct padding reveals the content of
the last byte of the plaintext, which gives the attacker the power to
decrypt some data without having the decryption key.
Figure 4: Illustration of CBC padding oracle attacks.
More specifically, as shown in Figure 4, the attacker can send a
ciphertext of n + 1 blocks to the victim, with the last two blocks
replaced by the two blocks of interest, e.g., B′n−1 and B
′
n in the
figure. Let’s denote the plaintext of B′n as P ′n , which is the value
the attacker hopes to learn. Therefore, P ′n = B′n−1 ⊕Dk (B′n ), where
Dk () is the decryption function of a block under the secret key,
k . The attack proceeds from the bytes on the right in the block
and gradually extends to bytes on the left: To decrypt the last two
bytes of P ′n , the attacker, at each time she queries the padding
oracle, XORs the last two bytes of B′n−1 with a value ∆, which
has a value ranging from 0x0000 to 0xFFFF . Then the resulting
plaintext is B′n−1 ⊕ ∆ ⊕ D(B′n ) = (B′n−1 ⊕ D(B′n )) ⊕ ∆ = P ′n ⊕ ∆.
When enumerating values of ∆ from 0x0000 to 0xFFFF , one of the
values will lead to a correct padding (i.e., 0x0101 as the last two
bytes). Therefore, the plaintext of the last two bytes of P ′n is simply
0x0101 ⊕ ∆. The attack continues to guess the other bytes on the
right by altering the value of ∆ and looking for a correct padding
of 0x020202, 0x03030303, etc.
The key to the success of such attacks is the ability to differen-
tiate the cases where a MAC error and a padding error occur at
the same time from the cases where only the padding error hap-
pens. When the error type is not reported, which is the case in
all SSL/TLS implementations after the publication of the original
padding oracle attacks in 2002 [71], the CBC padding oracle attacks
becomes very difficult. The recently published variants of the attack
worked around this defense to re-enable the oracles: In Lucky Thir-
teen attacks [12] and Lucky Microseconds attacks [13], a remote
timing-channel orcale was used to differentiate the two types of
errors. In POODLE attacks [52], the oracle is created by eliminating
the MAC errors when the plaintext is carefully crafted so that the
length of the padding is exactly one block (i.e., 16 bytes for AES). As
such, only padding errors may occur, which can be exploited as an
oracle. This attack only works for SSL v3 because a correct padding
only requires the last byte to be 16, while other padding bytes are
not specified. In contrast, because the TLS protocols specify the
content of every padding byte to be the length of the padding, it is
unlikely to decrypt an arbitrary ciphertext into the correct padding.
So the attack won’t work with TLS protocols. In this paper, the
oracle is reconstructed using a new type of side channels and the
attacks work on all SSL/TLS versions and implementations.
3 THREAT MODEL ANALYSIS
To analyze the security threats on Intel SGX imposed by side-
channel attacks, in this paper, we systematically study one im-
portant category of side-channel attacks—control-flow inference
attacks. In these attacks, the goal is to infer, by measuring side-
channel observations, the indirect control-flow transfers of the
enclave program and thereby learning sensitive information that is
shielded by SGX.
Inferring program control flows and learning sensitive infor-
mation are two separate steps. On one hand, the existence of
side-channel attack vectors, e.g., page-fault traces, cacheline ac-
cess traces, branch instruction traces, etc., enables control-flow
inference. We name such attacks control-flow inference attacks.
These attacks have been studied in previous studies. Here in this
paper, we propose a systematic approach to model control-flow
inference attacks, which enables discussion of these attacks without
specifying the exact attack techniques. On the other hand, control-
flow leakage does not always lead to a security breach. Only code
with secret-dependent control flows is vulnerable to control-flow
inference attacks.
3.1 Control-Flow Inference Attacks
In previous work, it has been shown that SGX enclaves are vulner-
able to a variety of side-channel attacks. Some manipulate page
table entries, some control shared caches, and others exploit shared
branch prediction units. The methods to collect side-channel ob-
servations are also diverse: Some attacks use hardware timestamp
counters to measure the execution time of specific code, some
use Last Branch Record (LBR) to measure elapsed cycles between
branch instructions, and some rely on deterministic events (e.g.,
page faults). Regardless of the attack techniques, we categorize
control-flow inference attacks into three levels: page-level attacks,
Figure 5: Three categories of control-flow inference attacks.
cacheline-level attacks, and branch-level attacks. We illustrate these
three levels in Figure 5.
Page-level attacks. It was reported by Xu et al. [73] that by clear-
ing the Present bit of the page table entries, the adversary controlling
the OS can force the EPC page accesses by the enclave program
to raise page fault exceptions and be trapped into the OS kernel
controlled by the adversary. In this way, the adversary could ob-
serve the enclave program’s page-level memory access pattern.
In our own exploration, we found not only the Present bit, other
bits in the page table entry, such as Reserved bits, NX bit, etc., as
well as Translation-Lookaside Buffers (TLB) and paging-structure
caches [1] also enable similar attack semantics. In this paper, we
model the side-channel observations collected in page-level attacks
as a sequence of page faults: < P1, P2, P3, · · · , Pn >, where Pi is the
virtual page frame number of the enclave program. With known
binary code of the enclave programs, Pi maps to a specific page of
executable code of the enclave program.
Cacheline-level attacks. Intel SGX does not prevent cache-based
side-channel attacks. Therefore, most prior work on cache-based
side-channel attacks is, in theory, applicable to SGX enclaves. While
it is challenging to model every single attack technique that has
been explored in previous studies, we abstractly model cache-based
side-channel attacks as a sequence of observations of the victim en-
clave program’s cacheline accesses: < C1,C2,C3, · · · ,Cn >, where
Ci is the virtual address of the beginning of the cacheline (i.e., cache-
line sized and aligned memory block). With known binary code of
the enclave programs, Ci maps to a specific cacheline-sized block
of executable code of the enclave program.
Branch-level attacks. Very recently, Lee et al. [43] demonstrated
that the control flow of enclave programs can be precisely traced at
every branch instruction because the Branch Prediction Units (BPU)
inside the CPU core is not flushed upon Asynchronous Enclave
Exit (AEX). Therefore, a powerful adversary could interrupt the
enclave execution, which triggers an AEX, and then execute a piece
of shadow code whose virtual addresses are the same as the victim
code in the lower 32-bit range—so that they are mapped to the
same entries in the Branch Target Buffer (BTB). The adversary
employs LBR to learn whether each branch of the shadow code
is correctly predicted or not, which apparently is influenced by
the branch history of the enclave program that is just interrupted.
To model these attacks, or other powerful attacks that are yet to
be discovered, we consider the strongest control-flow inference
attacks as a sequence of basic blocks that are executed in order:
< B1,B2,B3, · · · ,Bn >, where Bi is a basic block in the enclave
program’s control-flow graph (CFG).
3.2 Sensitive Control-Flow Vulnerabilities
If the enclave program has secret-dependent control flows, then
it is potentially vulnerable to control-flow inference attacks. Such
vulnerabilities are named sensitive control-flow vulnerabilities in
this paper. In this work, our focus is one of the most critical ap-
plications for SGX enclave—SSL/TLS libraries. Although SSL/TLS
libraries, e.g., OpenSSL, are implemented in a way that constant-
time execution is enforced, however, as we will show in this work,
they still have sensitive control-flow vulnerabilities due to improper
error handling and reporting, thus are vulnerable to control-flow
inference attacks.
4 DETECTING SSL/TLS VULNERABILITIES
WITH STACCO
In this section, we present the Side-channel Trace Analyzer for
finding Chosen-Ciphertext Oracles (Stacco), a differential analy-
sis framework for detecting sensitive control-flow vulnerabilities
in SSL/TLS implementations under the threat model we laid out
in Section 3. The core idea behind the framework is that when
provided with encrypted SSL/TLS packets with non-conformant
formats or incorrect paddings with different types of errors, the
decryption code may exhibit different control flows that give rise to
the decryption chosen-ciphertext oracles. To enable automated tests
for multiple oracle vulnerabilities on various SSL/TLS implementa-
tions under different attack models, i.e., page-level, cacheline-level
and branch-level control-flow inference attacks, we developed a
differential analysis framework (Section 4.1) and used it to evaluate
5 popular SSL/TLS libraries (Section 4.2).
4.1 Differential Analysis Framework
At the center of our differential analysis framework is a dynamic in-
strumentation engine to collect execution traces of the SSL/TLS im-
plementation. The overall architecture of our framework is shown
in Figure 6. Our framework consists of five components: a packet
generator (i.e., the TLS-attacker in the figure), an SSL/TLS program
linked to an SSL/TLS library under examination, a trace recorder
(i.e., Pin), a trace diff tool, and a vulnerability analyzer.
A complete run of one differential analysis test follows three
main steps. The first step is to collect two execution traces. The
packet generator generates two SSL/TLS packets following specific
rules (to be explained in Section 4.2) and sends them to the SSL/TLS
program. The programwhich is linked to the library being analyzed
runs on top of the Pin-based trace recorder, where the execution
traces of the analyzed library are collected. The second step is to
compare the two execution traces. Differences in the traces indicate
potential sensitive control-flow vulnerabilities. The final step is to
Figure 6: Architecture of the differential analysis frame-
work.
decide whether the differences in the traces are exploitable by the at-
tacker. Given a specific attackmodel, e.g., page-level, cacheline-level,
and branch-level control-flow inference attacks, the vulnerability
analyzer is able to tell whether the tested library is vulnerable to
such attacks and, if so, pinpoints the exploitable vulnerabilities.
Packet generator. The packet generator is in charge of generating
the input to the framework. It prepares encrypted packets with
specified plaintext or ciphertext (with specified errors) to be sent
to the peer at any stage of an SSL/TLS connection. In our imple-
mentation, we adopted an open-source tool, TLS-attacker [67]. It is
able to complete an SSL/TLS handshake or replace any packet in
this process. It is also able to send arbitrary data records after the
SSL/TLS connection has been successfully established.
Trace recorder. A core component of the framework is the execu-
tion trace recorder. We implemented the trace recorder on top of
Intel Pin. Pin [46] is a dynamic binary instrumentation framework
that is suitable for a range of program analysis tasks. It enables
various tools, called Pintools, to be developed using the framework.
Of interest to our purpose is its capability of dynamic instrumenting
a software program without changing its memory layout, which is
essential for detecting sensitive control-flow vulnerabilities. Partic-
ularly, a Pintool provided by Pinplay kit [55] can be used to create
the Dynamic Control-Flow graph (DCFG) of a program [75].
DCFG is defined by Intel as an extension of the control-flow
graphs (CFG) [14]. An example of a DCFG can be found in Figure 7.
Generally speaking, a DCFG shows the portion of a CFG that has
been executed. An edge in a DCFG is augmented with a counter,
which records the number of times this edge is executed. Pinplay kit
also provides an option to record the exact sequence of the executed
edges in the DCFG, which is called DCFG-Trace. Combining the
DCFG with the DCFG-Trace, Stacco is able to generate a trace of
basic blocks that has been executed by the instrumented programs.
In order to improve the runtime performance and to facilitate
data analysis, we need to specify which parts of the execution we
are most interested in. For example, if we are looking for vulner-
abilities in the handshake protocol, the execution trace should be
recorded only when the handshake APIs are called. However, we
found that such a selective tracing functionality that could have
been enabled by control options enter_func and exit_func in the
Pintool could not work properly with the SSL/TLS libraries. As a
solution, we added in the SSL/TLS program two empty functions
Figure 7: An example of DCFG.
foo() and bar() to wrap the functions that we are interested in,
by adding a call to foo() before it and bar() after it. Thus we
could control the Pintool to selectively trace functions when the
option -log:control start:address:foo,stop:address:bar
is enabled.
The output of the trace recorder consists of two JSON files. One
includes the DCFG as well as basic information such as base ad-
dresses of the libraries and the offsets of each of the basic blocks in
the libraries. The other JSON file contains a trace of DCFG edges.
We then extended the Pintool using Pin DCFG APIs to merge the
two files into a trace of basic blocks. Because the base addresses
of the libraries change every time we run the program, we use the
name of the library and the offset of the basic block to uniquely
identify a basic block.
It might be worthwhile noting here, that Pin has bugs when exe-
cuting certain functions (e.g., gnutls_record_recv() in GnuTLS)
and, as a result, the DCFG traces of these functions cannot be cor-
rectly recorded. For this special case, we replace the Pin-based trace
recorder with a Callgrind-based trace recorder. Callgrind is a tool
of Valgrind [53, 72] which is also a dynamic instrumentation frame-
work. We extend Callgrind to include timestamps for each function
call in order to recover the complete call trace from the call graph
generated by Callgrind. Unfortunately, Callgrind does not provide
fine-grained basic block tracing (e.g., DCFGs) like Pin.
The diff tools. Because the Pin-generated basic-block traces are
ordered sequences of basic blocks, the diff command of Linux OS
turns out to be enough to identify the differences between the two
traces. In contrast, the Callgrind-generated function call traces are
less structured. We, therefore, implemented a Python tool based on
difflib to compare Callgrind-generated function call traces, which
first converts the call traces to call trees with nodes associated with
timestamps, and then represent the call trees using XML, which
can be compared using difflib.
Vulnerability analyzer. Given the results of the diff tools, we
build a vulnerability analyzer in Python to examine sensitive control-
flow vulnerabilities. Particularly, the differences in the basic-block
traces are by themselves vulnerability to branch-level attacks. To
detect vulnerabilities at the cacheline level or the page level, we
need to convert the basic-block traces into traces of cachelines and
pages. Specifically, the virtual address of the beginning of each basic
block is calculated. The corresponding page trace can be obtained
by dividing the virtual addresses of the basic blocks by 4096, the
size of a memory page, and then merge consecutive basic blocks
together if they have the same page address. Similarly, cacheline
traces can be generated by dividing virtual addresses of the basic
blocks by 64, which is the size of a cacheline. After the conversion,
if the trace differences in the basic-block sequences render the same
cacheline trace or page trace, the program, as per this test, is not
vulnerable to cacheline-level or page-level control-flow inference
attacks.
4.2 Evaluation and Results
We applied Stacco to detect two types of oracle attacks, CBC
padding oracle attacks, and Bleichenbacher attacks, in the latest
versions (as of February 2017) of five popular open-source libraries
(see Table 1)1.
4.2.1 Bleichenbacher Tests. To detect vulnerabilities that en-
able Bleichenbacher attacks, we conducted a series of differential
tests. In each of the tests, we differentially analyzed two varia-
tions of the ClientKeyExchange messages in the handshake pro-
tocol. One of the two variations is a non-conformant message in
which the first two bytes of the plaintext is not 0x0002, which
we call the “standard error”; the other variation is a message
following one of the ten rules specified in Table 1. For example,
“PKCS#1 conformant” means that the ClientKeyExchange mes-
sage is correctly formatted according to PKCS#1 standard, but with
an incorrect PMS. If this message is not differentiable from the
“standard error”, the library is not vulnerable to Bleichenbacher
attacks. “Wrong Version” stands for the two version-number bytes
are incorrect. In the “No 0x00 Byte” test case, the delimiter 0x00
byte after the padding bytes is changed into a non-0x00 byte. The
test cases “0x00 in PKCS Padding” and “0x00 in Padding”
mean that some bytes in the corresponding padding bytes are mod-
ified to 0x00, which they should not if the messages are confor-
mant. Note that the first 8 bytes of the padding string are the PKCS
paddings while the rest bytes are regular paddings. They are treated
by the SSL/TLS library differently. “PMS Size” test cases are per-
formed by moving the 0x00 byte to somewhere in the middle of the
PreMasterSecret (PMS) so that PMS is truncated. For example,
“PMS Size=2” is done by moving 0x00 to the third last byte. Note
all the PreMasterSecret (PMS) in these tests are invalid so that
the error handling procedure is always triggered.
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 1. “D” suggests
that in the differential analysis, the two traces, when converted
to the corresponding level, are differentiable; “N” means the two
traces are not differentiable. If “PKCS#1 conformant” is differen-
tiable from “standard error”, it means we can construct an oracle
that when it returns true, we are certain that the corresponding
plaintext message starts with 0x0002. This means the tested library
is considered exploitable by a Bleichenbacher attack (labeled “✓” in
the row with the header “Exploitable”). However, what we do not
1As of August 2017, Intel’s SGX SDK [7] only contained a cryptographic library; and
the SSL/TLS implementation was not completed. Therefore, we could not conduct
tests on Intel’s official SGX SSL/TLS implementation.
know is whether the oracle returning false means the message does
not begin with 0x0002. If, at the same time, some of the other 9 tests
yield differentiable traces, it means we have a higher probability to
assert that when the oracle returns false the message does not start
with 0x0002, which leads to a stronger oracle.
In the cacheline-level and branch-level control-flow inference
attacks, the oracle strength is 1 for all libraries; this is because the
oracle only returns false when “standard error” happens. In these
cases, we have a very strong oracle that can help break the secret
with fewer queries. The page-level attacks against GnuTLS and
mbedTLS also have an oracle strength of 1, but those for OpenSSL
and LibreSSL are lower, which is roughly ( 255256 )8 × (1 − ( 255256 )
49) ≈
0.1691 when the RSA key size is 2048 (see Figure 3)2. It means the
adversary needs to send more (roughly, 10.1691 = 5.9×) queries
to the “weaker” oracle compared to using a stronger oracle (i.e.,
oracle strength is 1). The oracle strength for page-level control-flow
inference attacks against WolfSSL is the lowest, because most of
the differential tests render non-differentiable, making the oracle
attack very slow.
4.2.2 Padding Oracle Tests. To detect vulnerabilities that give
rise to CBC padding oracle attacks, we also performed a series of
tests. In each test, the framework is provided with two applica-
tion data messages that are encrypted with symmetric keys in the
CBC mode. All messages are four blocks in length. One message
only has an incorrect MAC, the “standard error”, and the other
message has both an incorrect MAC and one of the six padding
errors listed in Table 1. Specifically, the six test cases can be divided
into two groups: The first group of tests is conducted by modifying
the “Padding Length Byte” which is the last byte of a record;
the second group modify the last “Padding Byte” which is the
second last byte of a record. The two groups each generate one
error padding case by (1) XORing the target byte with 1, (2) set-
ting it to 0x00 and (3) setting it to 0xFF. We note that the test of
“Padding Length Byte = 0x00” is special. When it yields differen-
tiable traces, it means the padding length cannot be 0x00, therefore
our test should break the last two bytes together (by looking for
paddings of 0x0101). Otherwise, the attack can start with guessing
the last byte, greatly reducing the complexity of the attacks. None
of the SSL/TLS implementations we tested allow padding length to
be 0x00. But it only makes the attack slightly longer and does not
eliminate its vulnerability.
When the “standard error” can be differentiated from the
various padding errors, the library is vulnerable to padding oracle
attacks. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 1. We can see
that almost all libraries, except for OpenSSL, are vulnerable to all
levels of control-flow inference attacks. OpenSSL 1.0.2j is not vul-
nerable to page-level attacks because all its distinguishable traces
are contained in the same page. Another exception is GnuTLS. As
we have mentioned before, the Pintool does not support GnuTLS’s
gnutls_record_recv() function due to a bug in the tool. Conse-
quently, we used Callgrind-based trace recorder, which does not
support analysis at the branch level and the cacheline level.
4.2.3 Findings. Although some cryptographic libraries, such as
OpenSSL, aim to enforce constant-time implementations, Stacco
2It requires 0x00 in the 8-byte PKCS padding and No 0x00 in the last 48 + 1 bytes.
Table 1: Experiment results of the differential analyses. B: vulnerable to branch-level attacks? C: vul-
nerable to cacheline-level attacks? P: vulnerable to page-level attacks? D: Differentiable; N: Not differ-
entiable; N/A: unable to test.
Test Name
OpenSSL GnuTLS mbedTLS WolfSSL LibreSSL
1.0.2j 3.4.17 2.4.1 3.10.0 2.5.0
B C P B C P B C P B C P B C P
Bl
ei
ch
en
ba
ch
er
at
ta
ck
s
PKCS#1 Conformant D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D
Wrong Version D D D D D D D D D D D N D D D
No 0x00 Byte D D N D D D D D D D D N D D N
0x00 in Padding D D D D D D D D D D D N D D D
0x00 in PKCS Padding D D N D D D D D D D D D D D N
PMS Size=0 D D D D D D D D D D D N D D D
PMS Size=2 D D D D D D D D D D D N D D D
PMS Size=8 D D D D D D D D D D D N D D D
PMS Size=16 D D D D D D D D D D D N D D D
PMS Size=32 D D D D D D D D D D D N D D D
Exploitable ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Pa
dd
in
g
O
ra
cl
e
at
ta
ck
s
Padding Length Byte XOR 1 D D N N/A N/A D D D D D D D D D D
Padding Length Byte = 0x00 D D N N/A N/A D D D D D D D D D D
Padding Length Byte = 0xFF D D N N/A N/A D D D D D D D D D D
Last Padding Byte XOR 1 D D N N/A N/A D D D D D D D D D D
Last Padding Byte = 0x00 D D N N/A N/A D D D D D D D D D D
Last Padding Byte = 0xFF D D N N/A N/A D D D D D D D D D D
Exploitable ✓ ✓ ✗ N/A N/A ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
finds that all five SSL/TLS libraries are vulnerable to control-flow
inference attacks. In most cases, page-level attacks are sufficient to
create an oracle and perform oracle attacks against these libraries.
We scrutinized the identified vulnerabilities and found that there are
primarily two reasons for the leakage. First, the oracles for Bleichen-
bacher attacks are typically caused by the improper error logging
and reporting mechanisms in the library. Second, the oracles for
padding oracle attacks are typically created by the improper im-
plementation of constant-time cryptography in the patches for the
existing side-channel attacks (e.g., the Lucky Thirteen attack, cache
attacks, etc.). We briefly summarize one example in this section,
and list vulnerable code for other vulnerabilities in Appendix A.
Particularly, the CBC padding oracle in GnuTLS v3.4.17 can
be constructed by monitoring the execution order of the func-
tion ciphertext_to_compressed() (see Listing 1) and the func-
tion _gnutls_auth_cipher_add_auth() (Listing 2). Specifically,
dummy_wait() is called in ciphertext_to_compressed() when
the padding or MAC is incorrect. This function was designed to
defeat the timing-based Lucky Thirteen attack [12] by introduc-
ing intentional delays. However, dummy_wait() checks if the er-
ror is caused by incorrect padding (line 3 of Listing 2), and calls
_gnutls_auth_cipher_add_auth() (line 8 and 12 of Listing 2) if
the padding is correct (and the MAC is incorrect). In this example,
the decryption oracle is introduced by the defense against timing
attacks, but the control flow of the additional delay is leaked to the
more powerful man-in-the-kernel attackers.
5 VULNERABILITY VALIDATION
To validate the detected sensitive control-flow vulnerabilities by
Stacco, in this section, we describe in details two types of oracle
attacks against SSL/TLS implementations in enclaves: CBC padding
oracle attacks and Bleichenbacher attacks.
Listing 1: Snippet of ciphertext_to_compressed().
1 ...
2
3 ret =
4 _gnutls_auth_cipher_tag(&params->read.cipher_state,
tag, tag_size);
5 if (unlikely(ret < 0))
6 return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
7
8 if (unlikely
9 (gnutls_memcmp(tag, tag_ptr, tag_size) != 0 ||
pad_failed != 0)) {
10 /* HMAC was not the same. */
11 dummy_wait(params, compressed, pad_failed, pad,
12 length + preamble_size);
13
14 return
gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
15 }
16
17 ...
5.1 Attack Implementation
We implemented the page-level control-flow inference attacks by
extending the mainstream Linux operating system kernel. Our
implementation of the attack is shown in Figure 8. The extensions
to the kernel include several loadable kernel modules (LKM) and
some modification of the core kernel components.
In the core kernel components, particularly, we modified the
page-fault handling routine so that it is able to tackle a category of
page faults that are triggered because one of the reserved bits (e.g.,
Listing 2: Snippet of dummy_wait().
1 ...
2
3 if (pad_failed == 0 && pad > 0) {
4 len = _gnutls_mac_block_size(params->mac);
5 if (len > 0) {
6 if ((pad + total) % len > len - 9 && total
% len <= len - 9) {
7 if (len < plaintext->size)
8 _gnutls_auth_cipher_add_auth
9 (&params->read.cipher_state,
10 plaintext->data, len);
11 else
12 _gnutls_auth_cipher_add_auth
13 (&params->read.cipher_state,
14 plaintext->data,
plaintext->size);
15 }
16 }
17 }
bit 51 in our implementation) in the page table entries (PTE) is set.
This reserved bit in PTE is not already used by the Linux kernel, so
only the attack code could have triggered this type of faults. When
such page faults are intercepted, the page-fault handler resets the
reserved bit of the corresponding PTE to 0 so that future accesses
to the same page will be allowed (because otherwise the process
will hang due to frequent page faults); it also sets the reserved bit
of the last accessed page, tracked in a global variable in the kernel,
to 1 in order to capture future access of it. In sum, the kernel only
allows one executable page in the ELRANGE of the victim process
(that the attacker is interested in monitoring) to be accessible at a
time.
Figure 8: Overview of the at-
tack implementation.
A data array, dubbed
Page Trace Recorder (PTR),
is added to the kernel space
for the page-fault handler
to record the list of vir-
tual pages that has been ac-
cessed by the enclave pro-
gram. Each time a page
fault triggered by the re-
served bit in PTEs occurs,
the faulting page is ap-
pended to the list, which
also increments a global
counter by one.
The attacks can be ini-
tiated either from the userspace
or from the kernel. To facilitate the attacks, we implemented a set of
kernel interfaces, dubbed Paging Oracle Attack Program Interface
(POAPI), that can be triggered from both userspace and kernel space.
The interfaces are encapsulated as a kernel module, i.e., the POAPI
module in Figure 8. The interfaces are either used by a userspace
program, the attacker program in the figure, or by another kernel
module, the attack module in the figure. As either an attack pro-
gram or an attack module is needed in the two attacks we describe
shortly, they are labeled with asterisks to indicate only one of them
is needed in an attack.
To initiate the attack, the POAPI module is provided with the
name of the victim process, the virtual addresses of the EPC pages to
be monitored, and the specific page sequence (specified using page
indices rather than virtual addresses) to be monitored for oracle
construction. The sequence of pages is also called the template
sequence. POAPI locates the page tables of the victim process in the
kernel and sets the reserved bits of the PTEs to be 1 so that accesses
to these pages by the enclave code will be trapped into the kernel.
The template sequence is translated into the sequence of virtual
pages in this step, so it can be matched later with virtual page
sequences in PTR. POAPI provides two addition interfaces: First, a
Reset() call that will reset the PTR to empty. This functionality is
important in our oracle attacks as we need to repeatedly query the
oracles. Second, an Oracle() call that will return true or false: If
the template sequence matches the entire sequence in PTR, then
Oracle() returns true; otherwise it returns false.
5.2 CBC Padding Oracle Attacks
The oracle.We demonstrated the CBC padding oracle attack on
the implementation of TLS v1.2 in GnuTLS 3.4.17 (latest version
as of February 2017). Stacco suggests that this implementation
is vulnerable to page-level control-flow inference attacks. More
specifically, the correctness of the paddings can be revealed by the
execution order of two functions, ciphertext_to_compressed()
and _gnutls_auth_cipher_add_auth(). We found in our experi-
ments that by monitoring only the memory pages that contain these
two functions the adversary is able to construct a powerful oracle
for plaintext recovery. Therefore, our template sequence only con-
tains twomemory pages. Note that ciphertext_to_compressed()
is large and spans two pages. We selected the second page to moni-
tor. This is instructed by the differential analysis tool already, so no
manual analysis is needed. By labelling the memory page contain-
ing ciphertext_to_compressed() as index 0 and that containing
_gnutls_auth_cipher_add_auth() as index 1, the template se-
quence is “1010101010”.
Detailed implementation.We run the victim library inside SGX
with help of Graphene-SGX [5]. Particularly, the victim GnuTLS li-
brarywe attack is loaded as sgx.trusted_files into enclaves with
the victim server programs. However, GnuTLS does not support
Intel SGX: The initialization of the library will check the availability
of accelerated encryption instructions with the CPUID instruction—
an instruction not supported by SGX. Thus we modified the library
slightly by simply removing the check to allow it to run directly in
enclave (inside Graphene).
The padding oracle attack is implemented as a kernel module that
leverages the POAPI to query the padding oracle constructed from
the page-level control-flow inference attacks. The attack starts after
the SSL/TLS server in Graphene has been launched. The process
name, the virtual address of the two memory pages that contain the
two functions, and a template sequence “1010101010” are provided
through POAPI. If the encrypted message has a valid padding but
invalid MAC, Oracle() will find a match in the PTR and return
true. If both the padding and the MAC are invalid, a sequence of
“10101010” will be found in the PTR.
Following prior studies [12, 38], the padding oracle attack is per-
formed over multiple TLS sessions. This attack is practical when the
victim client can be triggered to repeatedly establish new TLS con-
nections with the victim server and send the same message in each
new connection. Particularly, the victim client first establishes a TLS
connection with the victim server using the SSL handshake protocol
and negotiates to use the TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cipher-
suite in TLS v1.2 (through a process that can be heavily influenced
by the man-in-the-kernel attacker). Then it sends an encrypted data
record to the server. The man-in-the-kernel attacker modifies the
ciphertext to prepare its query to the oracle. If the server receives
a data record with incorrect MAC or incorrect padding, it sends a
bad_record_mac alert to the client and shuts down the current TLS
session. When the client receives the alert, it immediately restarts a
new TLS connection to start a new query. The ciphertext will be dif-
ferent from the first time, as the symmetric key, i.e., AES key, used
to encrypt the data is different. The adversary will intercept the
message, again, and make modifications according to its adaptive
query strategies.
The attack kernel module we implemented for the CBC padding
oracle attacks, upon kernel module initialization, also registers a
Netfilter to intercept all the traffic sent to and from the server pro-
cess, by filtering traffic with specific port number. More specifically,
two hooks were registered with hooknum of NF_IP_LOCAL_IN and
NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT. With this functionality, the adversary is able
to examine each SSL/TLS packet and determine the packet type
by reading the first five bytes in the data segment of packets. Byte
1 indicates the content type. The adversary is interested in two
particular types: 0x15 and 0x17. 0x15 means the packet is an Alert
message and 0x17 means Application Data. Byte 2 and 3 are TLS
versions. Since we are attacking TLS 1.2, they should be 0x0303. The
last two bytes indicate the compressed plaintext length. If an Alert
message sent from the SSL/TLS server to the client is observed by
the kernel module, it means that the server has decrypted the mal-
formatted record and sent the client a bad_record_mac alert, the
adversary immediately checks the whether the corresponding plain-
text padding of the modified record is valid by calling Oracle().
Notice that when the Netfilter intercepts the packet and modifies
the ciphertext, all the checksums, such as IP and TCP checksums,
will fail when checked by the kernel. Thus, a special flag is added
to the modified packets and the kernel is modified to bypass all
packet integrity checks upon appearance of this flag.
Evaluation. The complexity of plaintext recovery with AES en-
cryption is at most 216 + 14 × 28 = 69, 120 queries. This is because
the last two bytes need to be enumerated together, but the rest of
the bytes can simply be decrypted one byte after another, leading
to a linear complexity in the size of the block. In our experiment to
decrypt one block with random data, the number of queries was
48388 and the execution time of the attack was 51m13s (less than
an hour).
Breaking mbedTLS-SGX.We also succeeded in carrying out the
CBC padding oracle attacks against an open-source SGX implemen-
tation of mbedTLS, mbedTLS-SGX [8], which can be loaded natively
in enclaves. Guided by Stacco, we chose two pages containing the
functions sha1_process_wrap() and mbedtls_sha1_process()
to monitor. The template sequence is “0101...10” (15 zeros and 14
ones). Incorrect-padding traces are “0101...010” (14 zeros and 13
ones) in all cases. In our experiment, the attack took 29 minutes
and 29 seconds with 25,717 queries to complete the decrypting of
one random AES block.
5.3 Bleichenbacher Attacks
The oracle. Our attack target was the implementation of TLS v1.2
in OpenSSL 1.0.2j (latest as of February 2017). Stacco identified
a vulnerability in the implementation: the control flows involv-
ing ERR_put_error() and RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2()
may leak sensitive information regarding the correctness of the
formatting. We label the two memory pages that contain the two
functions, respectively, as page 0 and page 1. The template sequence
is “1010”. Therefore, if the page sequence in the PTR matches the
template, the Oracle() returns true. Otherwise, in which case the
sequence in the PTR is typically “10101010”, the oracle returns false.
Detailed implementation.We use Graphene-SGX to run unmod-
ified OpenSSL inside SGX enclaves. Unlike GnuTLS, OpenSSL does
not have enclave-illegal instructions and can be loaded and ran di-
rectly by an SSL/TLS server as sgx.trusted_files in the enclave
with Graphene. To complete the attack, we extended the open-
source tool, TLS-Attacker [66], and implemented an add-on module.
We chose TLS-Attacker because it enables us to easily replace the
ClientKeyExchange message with any message we would like the
oracle to test. We did not implement any additional kernel modules
besides POAPI, as the desired computation in kernel space is rather
inefficient. All the attack steps were accomplished in the userspace
with the support of POAPI for querying the oracle.
With an intercepted ClientKeyExchange message, the attacker
conducts the Bleichenbacher attack to decrypt it and extract the
PreMasterSecret. To do so, the attacker initializes the man-in-
the-kernel attacks through the POAPI module and provides the
server process name, the virtual addresses of the two target pages,
and the template sequence “1010”. Then the attacker establishes
a series of queries: Before sending each query, he initiates a new
TLS handshake with the victim server. Right before sending the
crafted ClientKeyExchange message, the attacker calls Reset()
to POAPI to reset the PTR. Then the crafted message is sent and
the attacker waits until receiving the Alert message from the server.
Then the attacker calls Oracle() to query the oracle, depending
on the return value, the next ciphertext is calculated. This process
continues until the plaintext of the ClientKeyExchange message
is recovered.
Evaluation. The numbers of queries that are needed to break
the ClientKeyExchange message encrypted with a 1024-bit RSA
key, a 2048-bit RSA key and a 4096-bit RSA key are shown in
Table 2. It can be seen that the numbers of queries for breaking
ClientKeyExchange encrypted with 1024-bit key and 2048-bit key
are similar, this is because the oracle strength is not linear in the size
of the keys. Breaking the 2048-bit key encrypted ClientKeyExchange
takes roughly half an hour. Once the PreMasterSecret is known,
the attacker can decrypt all the intercepted application data
packets and hijack the future communication if the session is still
Table 2: Performance of the Bleichenbacher attacks
against OpenSSL with different key size.
1024 2048 4096
Num. of queries 19,346 19,368 57,286
Time to succeed 28m20s 33m24s 1h31m39s
alive. We anticipate an optimization in the attacks will further speed
up the process, possibly making an online SSL/TLS hijacking attack
feasible.
6 COUNTERMEASURES
Countermeasures to the demonstrated attacks can be pursued in
three different layers:
Preventing control-flow inference attacks.Although Intel claims
side-channel attacks are outside the threat model of SGX [6], given
the severity of the demonstrated attacks (among the others [43, 63,
73]), we believe it is reasonable for Intel to start exploring solutions
to these side-channel attacks, particularly control-flow inference
attacks. Some academic research studies have already made some
progress towards this direction [27, 32, 62, 63]. However, all of these
prior work only considers some of the side-channel attack vectors.
But effective solutions require a complete understanding of the at-
tack surfaces. Due to the lack of systematic knowledge, none of the
prior solutions have successfully prevented control-flow inference
attacks on all levels (i.e., page-level, cache-level, and branch-level).
We believe a considerable amount of research in this direction is
warranted.
Patching sensitive control-flow vulnerabilities. An alterna-
tive solution is to patch the vulnerabilities in the SSL/TLS implemen-
tations. Constant-time cryptography has been regarded the best
practice to address side-channel issues. But as shown in our study,
what create the oracles are not always the cryptographic opera-
tions themselves, but sometimes the error handling and reporting
functions (see Appendix A). Therefore, although some previous
work has attempted to verify the constant-time implementation in
OpenSSL [15, 16], our attacks suggest that the entire software pack-
age needs to be analyzed together rather than individual algorithms.
By contrast, Stacco can be used to dynamically analyze the whole
software program and pinpoint the vulnerabilities that violate the
constant-time programming paradigm. However, we admit that
patching the vulnerability is still a manual work. For instance, as
shown in Listing 4 and Listing 5, the oracle can be removed by elimi-
nating the RSAerr() call in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2()
as well as that in its caller function, RSA_eay_private_decrypt(),
since errors will be reported again after the PreMasterSecret is
recognized as invalid. If different error types are to be reported,
different return values could be used to tell them apart. After ap-
plying the patches manually, the SSL/TLS libraries can be tested
again using Stacco to identify the remaining vulnerabilities. Future
work should emphasize the automation of program analysis and
patching.
Avoiding using the vulnerable ciphersuites. The root cause of
the Bleichenbacher attacks is the use of the RSA algorithm for
key exchanges, which gives the man-in-the-middle adversary op-
portunities to query oracles and decrypt the key materials. It has
been shown that both PKCS#1 v1.5 and PKCS#1 v2 (i.e., RSAES-
OAEP) [47] are vulnerable to such attacks. Therefore, to completely
mitigate Bleichenbacher attacks, RSA-based key exchange must
be prohibited and the use of DH key exchanges must be enforced.
To mitigate CBC padding oracle attacks, it is recommended to re-
place MAC-Then-Encrypt with the Authenticated Encryption with
Associated Data (AEAD) mode, e.g., AES-GCM. In the draft ver-
sion of TLS v1.3 [11], it is recommended to use ciphersuites that
employ DH for key exchanges and AEAD modes for symmetric
encryption. However, because most SSL/TLS implementations need
to be backward compatible, it may take years before RSA-based key
exchanges and CBCmode symmetric encryptions completely phase
out. Given the severity of the demonstrated attacks in this paper,
we recommend enforcing the use of secure ciphersuites for enclave
programs, but it also means that any entities communicating with
the secure enclaves must design special security policies to disallow
the use of these vulnerable ciphersuites also.
7 RELATEDWORK
7.1 SSL/TLS Oracle Attacks
CBC padding oracle attacks. The first discussion of the CBC
padding oracle attacks was by Vaudenay in this seminal paper [71].
It was shown that plaintext recovery is possible without decryption
keys if an oracle that differentiates correct padding from incorrect
padding is available to the adversary. Implication on TLS v1.0 and
SSL v3.0 was discussed in the paper, which suggested TLS v1.0 was
potentially exploitable by such attacks because the padding error
message is observable as a reply, but SSL v3.0, due to its unified
error message, is more challenging to exploit. The Vaudenay attack
has been mitigated thereafter by eliminating the error-message
oracles.
The work of Vaudenay was followed up by several studies. Can-
vel et al. [25] exploited the timing differences in the SSL/TLS mes-
sage decryption process as a padding oracle. The timing differences
are caused by the absence of MAC checks when the format of the
padding is incorrect. The countermeasure implemented in popular
SSL/TLS libraries, e.g., OpenSSL, is to compute MAC regardless of
the padding correctness. However, almost 10 years later, this de-
fense mechanism was circumvented by more sophisticated timing
analysis attacks. AlFardan et al. [12] describe a new padding oracle
attack, dubbed Lucky Thirteen Attack, in which the adversary is
able to distinguish the latency of the returned SSL error message
when the number of hash function calls is different. The nuance can
serve as a padding oracle because the correctness of the padding
also dictates the number of hash function calls. Although the Lucky
Thirteen Attack was soon patched by adding dummy hash opera-
tions to enforce constant-time execution, new vulnerabilities were
later discovered by Albrecht et al. [13], who proposed new variants
of Lucky Thirteen attacks against the SSL/TLS implementation in
Amazon’s s2n. Möller et al. [52] performed a downgrade attack
against SSL/TLS, by forcing the use of SSL v3.0 during the nego-
tiation of cipher suite in the SSL handshake protocol. This attack
is also called POODLE attacks. SSL v3.0 is inherently vulnerable
to padding oracle attack because its the MAC does not protect the
padding and also padding is nondeterministic except for the last
byte. Due to POODLE attacks, SSL v3.0 has been deprecated.
Closer to our study is Irazoqui et al. [38], who demonstrated
padding oracle attacks enabled by Flush-Reload cache side chan-
nels. Our work goes beyond their study in two dimensions: first,
we systematically model various types of control-flow inference at-
tacks under the scenarios of secure enclaves, instead of considering
only cache side-channel attacks. Second, they only manually stud-
ied the source code of SSL/TLS implementations. In contrast, we
proposed a differential analysis framework to detect vulnerabilities
in a wide range of SSL/TLS implementations, enabling examination
of future implementations in an automated and black-box fashion.
Bleichenbacher attacks. Oracle attacks due to format errors in
asymmetric encryption, i.e., RSA algorithms, can date back to 1998
when Bleichenbacher [22] brought forward the first attack against
PKCS#1. These attacks rely on oracles of correctly formatted plain-
text message conforming to PKCS#1 v1.5 standard (i.e., plaintext
message must start with 0x0002). PKCS#1 v2 introduced RSAES-
OAEP which employs Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
(OAEP) to mitigate this original Bleichenbacher attack. A few years
later, it was discovered by Manger [47] that in RSAES-OAEP, the
length limitation of the plaintext to be encrypted renders its first
byte to be 0x00; failure of conformant to this standard will produce
an error message, which can serve as a new Bleichenbacher oracle.
Two years later, a new, so-called bad-version oracle, was discovered
by Klima et al. [42] by checking error message regarding incorrect
SSL/TLS version number in the formatted message. The efficiency
of the original Bleichenbacher attack was improved by Bardou et
al. [19], which was also the basis of our attacks. The solution to
these attacks was to unify the error messages so that the adversary
is not able to distinguish this particular format error. To achieve
this, TLS v1.0, v1.1, and v1.2 specification all prescribe that a ran-
dom number is generated and used as the PreMasterSecret to
enforce approximately equal processing time for both compliant
and non-compliant ClientKeyExchange messages.
In 2014, Meyer et al. [51] found that SSL/TLS was vulnerable to
timing-based Bleichenbacher attacks. Their attack was enabled by a
timing oracle due to the extra time used to generate pseudo-random
numbers when messages were non-compliant. Most recently, Avi-
ram [18] managed to leverage Bleichenbacher attacks to break
TLS 1.2, if the private key is shared with an SSL/TLS server that
supports the legacy SSL v2.0 protocol, which is still vulnerable to
simple Bleichenbacher attacks. A large number of servers were
vulnerable to this so-called DROWN attack. In the non-TLS set-
ting, Bleichenbacher attacks have been employed to break XML
encryption [39, 79].
Our work suggests that under the scenario of secure enclaves,
even the latest SSL/TLS implementations are vulnerable to Bleichen-
bacher attacks because the oracles due to sensitive control-flow
vulnerabilities are difficult to conceal even in shielded enclaves.
7.2 Intel SGX: Applications and Attacks
Intel SGX is a revolutionary technology for applications that re-
quire shielded execution—execution that is isolated from interfer-
ence or inspection by any other software components including
the privileged system software. It also offers remote attestation and
sealed storage primitives for trusted computations. Applications
that utilize these new SGX features have been proposed in previ-
ous studies [17, 20, 36, 50, 59, 69, 76]. Others have been working
on facilitating the development and security protection of SGX
enclaves [48, 61, 64].
Side-channel attacks against SGX enclaves have been described
in a few studies. For example, Xu et al. [73] and Shinde et al. [63] ex-
plored leakage of page-level memory access pattern due to induced
page-fault traces. Lee et al. [43] explored processor Branch Target
Buffers (BTB) to exploit sensitive control-flow vulnerabilities in
secure enclaves. Besides these new attacks in SGX contexts, exist-
ing cache attacks are also applicable against SGX enclaves [23, 60],
since SGX provides no additional protection against such attacks.
Defenses against these attacks are implemented on the hardware
level [32] or as compiler extensions [27, 62, 63]. These defenses pri-
marily work on page-fault attacks [27, 32, 62, 63] or interrupt-based
side-channel attacks [27, 62]. Therefore, they only remove a portion
of the entire attack surface. Completely eliminating control-flow
inference attacks that we model in Section 3 is extremely challeng-
ing. Therefore, our study of SSL/TLS implementations’ sensitive
control-flow vulnerabilities is not completely addressed by any of
these specific defense techniques.
7.3 Security Analysis of TLS Implementations
There has been work on verifying constant-time implementation
for SSL/TLS libraries [15, 16]. However, our findings suggest that
control-flow leakages still exist even when constant-time mech-
anisms are employed, especially when the constant-time imple-
mentation is enforced by making dummy function calls which may
include control flows that depend on the error types. We also find
leakage occurs when the internal error logging and reporting func-
tions reveal the reasons for the errors.
Differential analysis has been applied to examine the implemen-
tation of certificate validation in TLS libraries [24, 29]. Others focus
on determining whether a TLS implementation correctly follows
the TLS protocol [21, 34, 66]. Our work is different from them both
in the design goals and the methodologies.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied oracle attacks against SSL/TLS implemen-
tations in SGX. These attacks are enabled by sensitive control-flow
vulnerabilities in SSL/TLS libraries and are exploitable by branch-
level, cacheline-level, and page-level control-flow inference attacks.
Our implementation of man-in-the-kernel attacks empirical demon-
strated that the resulting oracle attacks are highly efficient. We
also designed a differential analysis framework to help detect these
vulnerabilities automatically. We show that all the open-source
SSL/TLS libraries we examined are exploitable, thus raising the
questions of secure development and deployment of SSL/TLS in
SGX enclaves.
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A EXAMPLES OF SENSITIVE
CONTROL-FLOW VULNERABILITIES
A.1 Padding Oracles in mbedTLS(-SGX)
In mbedTLS v2.4.1 and mbedTLS-SGX, the decryption oracle can
be constructed by monitoring the function sha1_process_wrap()
and mbedtls_sha1_process(). Particularly, as shown in Listing 3,
the function ssl_decrypt_buf() calls mbedtls_md_process(),
which is a wrapper function that calls both sha1_process_wrap()
and mbedtls_sha1_process(), to conceal the timing difference
caused by removing the paddings before calculating the MAC.
However, the number of times mbedtls_md_process() is called
depends on the value of extra_run, which is calculated from the
length of the padding, padlen. Particularly, when the padding is
incorrect, padlen will be 0, and mbedtls_md_process() is called
only once. Therefore, the number of calls to sha1_process_wrap()
and mbedtls_sha1_process(), which are located on different pages,
has been exploited as the oracle in our demonstrated attacks. We
note that the padding oracle is created due to the improper constant-
time implementation of defenses to existing attacks.
A.2 Bleichenbacher Attack Oracles in OpenSSL
The oracle in OpenSSL 1.0.2j is created by function RSAerr().
As shown in Listing 5, in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(),
when any error is detected during the PKCS decoding procedure,
mlen will be set to -1. Thus RSAerr() will be called to report the
error before the function returns. After returning to the caller func-
tion RSA_eay_private_decrypt() (shown in Listing 4), RSAerr()
is called one more time. These two calls to the RSAerr() reveals a
non-PKCS-conformant formatting, which can be exploited as an
oracle for Bleichenbacher attacks. The vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
is not because of a failed constant-time implementation, but the
redundant error reporting and logging mechanisms. One possi-
ble suggestion is to avoid repeated error reporting that are due to
different reasons.
A.3 Bleichenbacher Oracles in GnuTLS
Similar to OpenSSL, the RSA decryption oracle in GnuTLS is also
due to error logging and reporting. As shown in Listing 6, the
function _gnutls_debug_log() is called for either an incorrect
PKCS format or incorrect version numbers. Although GnuTLS ap-
plies the countermeasure against Bleichenbacher attack by using
Listing 3: Snippet of ssl_decrypt_buf()
1 ...
2
3 padlen &= correct * 0x1FF;
4 ...
5
6 size_t j, extra_run = 0;
7 extra_run = ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + padlen + 8 ) / 64
8 - ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + 8 ) / 64;
9
10 extra_run &= correct * 0xFF;
11
12 mbedtls_md_hmac_update(
&ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_ctr, 8 );
13 mbedtls_md_hmac_update(
&ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_hdr, 3 );
14 mbedtls_md_hmac_update(
&ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_len, 2 );
15 mbedtls_md_hmac_update(
&ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg,
16 ssl->in_msglen );
17 mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(
&ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
18 ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen );
19 /* Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache
attacks */
20 for( j = 0; j < extra_run + 1; j++ )
21 mbedtls_md_process(
&ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg
);
22 ...
Listing 4: RSA_eay_private_decrypt()
1 ...
2
3 switch (padding) {
4 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
5 r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num,
buf, j, num);
6 break;
7 ...
8 }
9 if (r < 0)
10 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
11 RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
12 ...
random PreMasterSecrets, the logging functions expose the er-
ror messages to the adversary with the capability of conducting
control-flow inference attacks.
Listing 5: RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2()
1 ...
2
3 if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
4 return -1;
5 if (flen > num)
6 goto err;
7 if (num < 11)
8 goto err;
9 ...
10
11 good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
12 good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
13 ...
14
15 good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index),
2 + 8);
16 ...
17
18 good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen),
(unsigned int)(mlen));
19 if (!good) {
20 mlen = -1;
21 goto err;
22 }
23
24 err:
25 if (em != NULL)
26 OPENSSL_free(em);
27 if (mlen == -1)
28 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
29 RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
30 return mlen;
Listing 6: Snippet of proc_rsa_client_kx()
1 ...
2
3 if (ret < 0 || plaintext.size != GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE)
{
4 _gnutls_debug_log("auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1
format attack\n");
5 use_rnd_key = 1;
6 } else {
7 if (_gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session) !=
8 plaintext.data[0] ||
9 (session->internals.priorities.allow_wrong_pms == 0
10 && _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session) !=
11 plaintext.data[1])) {
12 _gnutls_debug_log("auth_rsa: Possible PKCS
#1 version check format attack\n");
13 }
14 }
15 ...
